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Meyer v. State, 119 Nev. Adv. Rep. 61, 80 P.3d 447 (2003)1 
 
EVIDENCE–JUROR MISCONDUCT-NEW TRIAL 
 
“The right to trial by jury, if it is to mean anything, must mean the right to a fair 
and impartial jury.  A litigant is therefore entitled to a jury composed of 12 
impartial jurors; …a party has the right to have that decision, whether for or 
against him, based on the honest deliberations of 12 such individuals.”2 
 
The legitimacy of our justice system hinges on the fact that the results of trials, as 
dictated by a jury of one’s peers, remain free from the taint of extrinsic evidence and are 
grounded solely on the evidence presented by the parties at trial.  However, when jurors 
bring with them to the jury box professional expertise or other experiences, such may 
enhance the deliberations and ensure that the parties are afforded a better verdict 
determined by a more educated jury.  This is true as long as those experiences and 
expertise were properly exposed during voir dire. 
  
In Meyer v. State, the Nevada Supreme Court clarified the standard of review for 
cases of alleged jury tampering or juror misconduct.3  The following Nevada Law 
Commentary will discuss the facts and disposition of the Meyer case.  Next, it will 
discretely outline the standard pronounced by Meyer regarding obtaining a new trial 
based on allegations of juror misconduct stemming from improper extrinsic evidence and 
improper use of a juror’s own expertise and experiences.  Finally, the corollary of when 
jurors conceal material information during voir dire will be discussed.   
 
In many respects, Meyer is a sound and laudable ruling that will serve to clarify 
what the law is, while enhancing the jury deliberation process, a pillar of the legitimacy 
of our civil and criminal adversary system of justice relies on.  Yet, the potential for 
jurors to conceal, during the voir dire stage, their experiences despite being asked about 
them may serve to weaken Meyer’s foundation.  As such, the Nevada Supreme Court 
would be wise to one day clarify the new trial standard based on such concealment.  
  
1. Meyer’s Facts, Disposition, and Analysis 
Meyer was convicted of sexually assaulting his estranged wife Catrina.4  The 
events leading to the conviction included a meeting between Meyer and Catrina at a bar, 
where Catrina intended to have Meyer served with a temporary protective order (TPO).5  
Intoxicated, Catrina left with Meyer.6  Officers were eventually dispatched to Catrina’s 
residence, having been contacted by Catrina’s current boyfriend who had reported to 
police receipt of a phone call where Meyer, “hostile and threatening,” had described to 
                                                 
1 By Timothy W. Roehrs, Nevada Law Journal Senior Staff member and third year student at the William 
S. Boyd School of Law at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. 
2 McNally v. Walkowski, 462 P.2d 1016, 1018 (Nev. 1969). 
3 Meyer v. State, 80 P.3d 447, 451 (Nev. 2003). 
4 Id. at 453. 
5 Id. at 451. 
6 Id.  
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him a violent assault he was then committing against Catrina.7  When police arrived at 
Catrina’s residence, they found Catrina wrapped in a blanket in her bedroom.8  Catrina 
“had blood on her hands, various scratches and bruises over her body, as well as 
significant injuries to her mouth and lips” and a series of raised bumps all over her scalp.9  
Catrina alleged that Meyer had forced her to leave with him.10   
 
Meyer was arrested nine weeks later and charged with kidnapping and “anal 
sexual assault.”11  Catrina later recanted accusations previously waged, indicating that 
“she remembered consenting to vaginal sex, and that she could have consented to anal 
sex.”12  Later, at trial, she testified that she asked Meyer to take her home because she 
was drunk.13  She said that she did not remember any details, other than throwing up, 
including whether she and Meyer had sex or how she received her numerous injuries.14  
Further, she suggested that “her injuries were the result of falling down and that she 
bruised easily because she was taking the prescription medicine Accutane.”15  She also 
admitted to previously engaging in “rough sex” with Meyer.16  Both sides presented 
competing expert witness testimony with regard to the source of Catrina’s injuries 
(including the bumps on her head) and the effects which Accutane may have had.17 
                                                 
7 Id. at 451-52. 
8 Id. at 452. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 Id.; see also id. at 453 (“Meyer’s expert witnesses did not attribute Catrina’s bruises to the side effects of 
Accutane.). 
16 Id. at 452. 
17 See id. at 453. 
(“In addition to Catrina's testimony and prior statements, the State presented evidence regarding 
Battered Woman Syndrome, Catrina's 911 calls to police, photographs of her injuries, a 
videotaped interview that Catrina gave to the police the day after the incident, medical testimony 
regarding the sexual assault examination and findings, Hunt's testimony about his phone call with 
Meyer, and the responding officers' observations. The State also presented expert medical 
testimony from Dr. Ellen Clark, who indicated that Catrina's injuries were consistent with being 
punched and kicked and were not consistent with falling down due to intoxication. Dr. Clark also 
indicated that the injuries were not the result of Accutane side effects. On cross-examination, Dr. 
Clark agreed that someone hitting the toilet bowl while vomiting might cause the lip injury and 
that bumping into a door jam could have caused a shoulder injury. 
 
Meyer testified and indicated that he went to Sneakers at Catrina's request. She was intoxicated 
and left with him voluntarily. He admitted that he gave the police false information because he 
feared that he might be taken to jail. Meyer indicated that falling down and bumping into various 
items that night caused Catrina's injuries. He admitted to having vaginal intercourse with Catrina 
and digitally penetrating her anus, however, he stated both acts were consensual. Meyer also 
disputed Hunt's version of the phone call. Finally, Meyer testified that he was not fleeing the 
country when he was but was on vacation for seven weeks with his girlfriend,  although he 
admitted that he knew at least two days after the incident that the police were looking for him. 
 
Meyer presented testimony from three experts. Dr. Donald Henrikson indicated that Catrina's 
injuries were consistent with falling down or bumping into items. He indicated the anal injuries 
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Meyer was acquitted of first-degree kidnapping, but was found guilty of sexual 
assault.18  After speaking with jurors, Meyer subsequently filed a motion for a new trial 
based upon alleged jury misconduct and the trial court denied the motion.19 The Nevada 
Supreme Court overturned the trial court’s new trial denial.20   
 
Meyer’s motion for a new trial was grounded, principally, in two arguments.  
First, with regard to the “bruises, marks, or bumps” on Catrina’s scalp, affidavits 
established that one juror, who was a Washoe Medical Center nurse, had opined that the 
bumps were similar to those she had observed in domestic violence hair pulling 
situations.21  Second, another juror, had consulted a “Physicians’ Desk Reference” (PDR) 
on the side effects of Accutane and had advised the jury that “[a]ccutane only causes easy 
bruising in one percent of the population.”22   
 
The Nevada Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s conclusion that the juror’s 
statements about the connection between hair-pullling and the scalp injuries in question 
did not constitute misconduct because that juror “used her everyday experience as a 
nurse, not extrinsic information.23  Following the New Mexico Supreme Court in Mann, 
the court held that “a juror who has specialized knowledge or expertise may convey their 
opinion based upon such knowledge to fellow jurors.  The opinion, even if based upon 
information not admitted into evidence, is not extrinsic evidence and does not constitute 
juror misconduct.”24  The court highlighted that voir dire is an opportunity for attorneys 
to question jurors about their expertise and subject them to preemptory or for cause 
challenges.25  Indeed, jurors failing to disclose information during voir dire commit 
misconduct, which may serve as grounds for a new trial.26 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
were minor and that the small bumps on Catrina's head could be acne, though they were more 
likely to have been caused by ‘minor blunt force injury.’ Dr. Thomas Turner testified about 
alcoholism and alcoholic blackouts. He opined that Catrina suffered such a blackout on the night 
in question and that her statements were probably the result of conversations with others rather 
than a true memory of what happened. Finally, Diane Faugno, a registered nurse and sexual 
assault examiner, testified that Catrina's injuries were inconsistent with being hit and kicked in the 
head, though the lip injuries were consistent with being hit.  Faugno had no opinion regarding the 
source of the small bumps on Catrina’s head.  Faugno indicated she saw nothing in the evidence 
she reviewed that suggested a violent, nonconsensual sexual assault, but she admitted she could 
not rule out sexual assault. Meyer's expert witnesses did not attribute Catrina's bruises to the side 
effects of Accutane.) 
 
The State and Meyer produced additional witnesses who presented conflicting evidence about 
Catrina's appearance, statements, or attitude before and after the incident. Finally, the State 
introduced evidence of a prior domestic violence incident involving Meyer.”). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 451. 
21 Id. at 457. 
22 Id.  
23 Id. at 457-58. 
24 Id. at 459. 
25 Id. at 459-60. 
26 Id. at 460. 
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On the issue of the extrinsic PDR research, the Nevada Supreme Court held that 
the actions constituted juror misconduct that amounted to prejudice and ordered a new 
trial on that basis.27  It found that the PDR information on Accutane was material to the 
case and “tended to undermine Meyer’s theory that the victim’s physical marks were 
caused by a reaction to medication or falling.”28  As such, the court held that “the 
average, hypothetical juror could have been affected by this extraneous information, and 
there is a reasonable probability that the PDR information affected the verdict.”29    
 
2. Meyer’s Rule Regarding Obtaining a New Trial Based on Juror Misconduct 
in Nevada 
 
In addition to the aforementioned disposition, Meyer gave an insightful step by 
step standard for when jury misconduct can lead to a new trial.  A description of this 
standard follows. 
 
 The denial of a motion for a new trial will be upheld absent an abuse of 
discretion by the trial court.30  A district court’s findings of fact cannot be disturbed 
absent clear error.31  Yet, de novo review of a trial court’s conclusions regarding the 
prejudicial effect of any misconduct will apply to allegations that the jury was exposed to 
extrinsic evidence in violation of the Confrontation Clause.32   
 
a. Proving misconduct 
Generally, at common law, jurors may not impeach their own verdict.33  The 
exception to this rule is where extrinsic information or contact with the jury occurs.34  In 
such instances, “juror affidavits or testimony establishing the fact the jury received the 
information or was contacted are permitted.”35  “An extraneous influence includes, 
among other things, publicity or media reports received and discussed among jurors 
during deliberations, consideration by jurors of extrinsic evidence, and third-party 
communications with sitting jurors.”36  By contrast, intrinsic or intra-jury influences (i.e. 
improper discussions among jurors, harassment, and intimidation) are generally not 
admissible to impeach a jury verdict.37  To prove misconduct, one must show “readily 
ascertainable” objective facts and not delve into a juror’s thought process or state of 
mind.38 
 
 
                                                 
27 Id. at 460-61. 
28 Id.at 460. 
29 Id. at 460-61. 
30 Id. at 453. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 454. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
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b. Burden of Proof 
To prevail on a new trial motion, the defendant must present admissible evidence 
that establishes: (1) that juror misconduct occurred, and; (2) the misconduct was 
prejudicial.39  If there is a reasonable probability or likelihood that misconduct affected a 
verdict then that misconduct is prejudicial.40 
 
i. Determing whether Misconduct is prejudicial 
Prejudice sufficient to warrant a new trial will be presumed where an extraneous 
influence is excessively egregious, such as in cases of jury tampering.41  Extrinsic 
influences are by their nature more likely to be prejudicial, and establish a reasonable 
probability that extrinsic contact affected the verdict.  Examples include direct third-party 
communications with a sitting juror relating to “an element of the crime charged” or 
exposure to significant extraneous information concerning the crime charged or 
concerning the defendant.42  To the contrary, extrinsic material like media reports will not 
raise a presumption of prejudice.43  In cases involving the latter, “extrinsic information 
must be analyzed in the context of the trial as a whole” to determine if by a reasonable 
probability the verdict was affected.44 
 
ii. Evaluating Misconduct 
To determine whether there is a reasonable probability that juror misconduct 
affected a verdict, instructive, but not dispositive factors deserving consideration include:  
 
“…how the material was introduced to the jury (third-party contact, media source, 
independent research, etc.), the length of time it was discussed by the jury, and the 
timing of its introduction (beginning, shortly before verdict, after verdict, etc.).  
 
 …whether the information was ambiguous, vague, or specific in content; whether 
it was cumulative of other evidence adduced at trial; whether it involved a 
material or collateral issue; or whether it involved inadmissible evidence 
(background of the parties, insurance, prior bad acts, etc.).  
 
[and]…the extrinsic influence in light of the trial as a whole and the weight of the 
evidence.”45 
 
Thereafter, “whether the average, hypothetical juror would be influenced by the juror 
misconduct” must be determined.46 
                                                 
39 Id. at 455. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. The Court refused to follow those federal courts that have concluded that exposure to any extrinsic 
influence will establish a reasonable likelihood that the information affected the verdict and adopted the 
position of other federal circuit courts that examine the nature of the extrinsic influence in determining 
whether such influence is presumptively prejudicial. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 455-56. 
44 Id. at 456. 
45 Id. 
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c. Alleged misconduct – motion for new trial. 
Meyer provided key boundaries on what might constitute misconduct: 
 
“In reaching their verdict, jurors are confined to the facts and evidence regularly 
elicited in the course of the trial proceedings.  A juror is prohibited from declaring 
to his fellow jurors any fact relating to the case as of his own knowledge. 
However, jurors may rely on their common sense and experience.  If a juror has 
personal knowledge of the parties or of the issues involved in the trial that might 
affect the verdict, the communication of that knowledge to other jurors is 
considered extrinsic evidence and a form of misconduct.  Likewise, if a juror 
considers and communicates a past personal experience that introduces totally 
new information about a fact not found in the record or the evidence, this would 
constitute extrinsic evidence and improper conduct.  Personal experiences are to 
be used only to interpret the exhibits and testimony, not as independent 
evidence.”47 
 
i. Analysis of the evidence by a juror with professional expertise  
It is possible that a juror’s experiences make their statements in jury deliberations 
more akin to a form of expert opinion.48   In considering the question of whether quasi-
expert opinion statements by jurors constitute misconduct, courts around the country are 
split.49  Following the direction articulated by the New Mexico Supreme Court, Meyer 
announced the following rules: 
 
“A juror who has specialized knowledge or expertise may convey their opinion 
based upon such knowledge to fellow jurors. The opinion, even if based upon 
information not admitted into evidence, is not extrinsic evidence and does not 
constitute juror misconduct. However, a juror is still prohibited from relating 
specific information from an outside source, such as quoting from a treatise, 
textbook, research results, etc.”50 
 
“Jurors are prohibited from conducting an independent investigation and 
informing other jurors of the results of that investigation.”51 
 
In supporting this rule, responsibility has been placed squarely on the shoulders of: 
attorneys, jurors’ honesty, and the integrity of the voir dire proceeding: 
 
 “During voir dire, prospective jurors may be questioned regarding any 
knowledge or expertise they may have on an issue to be tried and, based upon 
their responses, may be the subject of peremptory or for cause challenges. Jurors 
                                                                                                                                                 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 458. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 459. 
51 Id. at 460. 
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who fail to disclose information or give false information during voir dire 
commit juror misconduct, which, if discovered after the verdict, may be grounds 
for a new trial under the standards established for juror misconduct during voir 
dire as opposed to misconduct that occurs during deliberations.”52 
 
3. Meyer’s Implications 
 
Courts are in disagreement with regard to the question of whether quasi-expert 
opinion statements by jurors constitute misconduct.  New Mexico, which Meyer 
followed, has held that “jurors can rely on their professional experience and educational 
experiences when deliberating” and such communication does not constitute extrinsic 
evidence.53  In New York, where a nurse expressed her expertise as to a material issue of 
the case, a new trial was ordered.54  In recognizing that jurors could use expertise to 
arrive at their own decision regarding credibility or the verdict itself, New York 
suggested that “trial courts modify their standard preliminary instructions so that jurors 
are advised that they could not use their professional expertise to supplement the record 
on material issues.”55  In a “middle of the road” approach, California allows jurors, 
regardless of their education or employment background to express technical opinions so 
long as that opinion is based on the evidence at trial.56   
 
In choosing the New Mexico approach, Meyer cited New Mexico’s contention 
that it might be difficult to “distinguish between a juror’s opinions and experiences as 
improper extraneous information and permissible deliberation based on life 
experiences.”57  Moreover, if an attorney feels that a juror’s education or professional 
background may cause them to be biased that juror can be removed during voir dire and a 
failure of jurors to reveal important information about their expertise may be grounds for 
a new trial.58 
 
a. A Problem: Juror nondisclosure during voir dire 
Meyer did fail to contemplate one important consideration: the extent to which 
jurors will not be upfront during voir dire.59  And further, when is a juror’s concealment 
actually intentional?   
 
Jurors’ failing to disclose material information during voir dire is neither a recent 
development, nor is it an unusual one.60  Accounts of information withheld include: 
                                                 
52 Id. at 459-60 (emphasis added). 
53 Id. at 458. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 459. 
57 Id. at 458-59. 
58 Id. at 459. 
59 As it was not an issue in Meyer, this comment will refrain from delving comprehensively into the 
standard for a new trial based on juror concealment during voir dire.  For an excellent survey of what other 
states do and a well informed argument on what the standard should be see Robert G. Loewy, When Jurors 
Lie: Differing Standards for New Trials, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 733 (1995).   
60 Id. at 734.   
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failing to reveal having been a victim of a spousal abuse or even failing to reveal having 
met the defendant.61  Jurors fail to respond honestly during voir dire, among other 
reasons, because of: nerves, a desire to serve that outweighs the desire to tell the truth, or 
because voir dire questions are “too trivial to merit an honest response.”62  Some may 
even hope to use their jury experience as anecdotal fodder for future conversations with 
friends.63  “Most research indicates that approximately twenty-five percent of jurors fail 
to reveal material information during voir dire.”64   
 
So when can a party get a new trial based on a juror concealing material 
information during voir dire?  Nevada’s standard holds that “a juror's intentional 
concealment of a material fact relating to his qualification to be a fair and impartial juror 
in the case may require the granting of a new trial.”65  “Where it is claimed that a juror 
has answered falsely on voir dire about a matter of potential bias or prejudice, in the final 
analysis, the termination turns upon whether” the juror committed intentional 
concealment, the determination of which, is left to the sound discretion of the trial 
court.66 
 
“The states vary, …in their approach to determine intentional concealment; some 
use an objective test, while others use a subjective test.  States using an objective 
test will look to see whether a reasonable juror would have disclosed the 
information during voir dire.  States using a subjective test will look to see 
whether the juror in question acted honestly and in good faith.”67   
 
In Lopez, the Nevada Supreme Court refused to overturn the denial of a new trial 
motion based on a two jurors’ failure to reveal that they had been the victim of child 
abuse.68  There, both jurors, when questioned if they had been the victim of child abuse 
answered no, but did so, apparently, because neither associated the child abuse they 
endured to be a crime.69  The Nevada Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that this 
reasoning revealed no intentional concealment.70  Nevada jurisprudence since Lopez has 
had varied results; in one instance upholding a new trial motion denial where a juror 
again mistook the meaning of what a crime was and later overruling the trial court denial 
of a new trial motion where a juror failed to reveal that his father had been murdered 
when asked if he or a family member had ever been a victim of a crime.71 
                                                 
61 Id.   
62 Id.     
63 Id.     
64 Id.     
65 McNally v. Walkowski, 462 P.2d 1016, 1018-19 (Nev. 1969). 
66 Lopez v. State, 769 P.2d 1276, 1290 (Nev. 1989).   
67 Loewy, supra note 59 at 736-37. 
68 Id.     
69 Id. at 1290-91.  
70 Id. at 1291.  
71 See Echavarria v. State, 839 P.2d 589, 593-94 (Nev. 1992)  
(“Juror Charles Ivy, who served as foreman, failed to indicate on a written questionnaire or during 
voir dire that he had been the victim of a crime.   At the evidentiary hearing on juror misconduct, 
Ivy admitted mentioning to some of the other jurors during a recess that he had been in a fight as a 
youth many years ago in which he was beaten by men with tire irons and hospitalized.   Ivy 
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A standard that too easily finds “intentional” concealment based on jury 
nondisclosure may incentivize lawyers, post verdict, to “track down jurors and question 
them about every aspect of the deliberations in hope of finding some ‘inadvertent’ 
error.”72  However, a standard that which makes getting a new trial based on jury 
nondisclosure too difficult will undermine the Meyer ruling, and its dependence on jurors 
giving honest answers during voir dire.   
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Nevada’s jury concealment new trial standard, which is subjective,73 may not be 
tough enough and needs to be further defined.  Possibly, the objective standard, which 
will more easily bring about the new trial penalty based on an unreasonable juror voir 
dire concealment that eventually taints a jury verdict, will better comport with Meyer’s 
rather liberal allowance of a juror’s expertise and experiences in deliberations.  But more 
questions need to be answered:74 among others, when is a concealment material; what 
responsibility does the lawyer have in asking the right questions such to tease out 
information that might otherwise be concealed and even given concealment when does 
such concealment actually lead to jury bias? 
 
Fundamentally, Meyer is a sound piece of case law.  But as is often the case, the 
Nevada Supreme Court has left open for itself more work to do with regard to jury 
misconduct / new trial legal doctrine. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
indicated that he did not consider himself to be a victim of a crime, but instead considered the 
incident a fight.  …As Ivy's testimony indicates that he did not view the 24-year-old incident as a 
criminal act, the district court was well within its discretion in determining that Ivy did not 
intentionally conceal information from the court.”);  
 
but see Canada v. State, 944 P.2d 781, 782-83 (Nev. 1997) (During voir dire and on the jury questionnaire, 
juror, Gordon, “was asked whether he, a family member, or a close friend had ever been a victim of a 
crime.   He answered, ‘Thank God, No’ and ‘Never.’”  Later, “he informed the other jurors, both during the 
trial and penalty phases, that his own father had been murdered when he was an infant.  …The trial court 
concluded that there had been no juror misconduct because Juror Gordon had not intentionally concealed 
any information during the jury selection process.”  The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that “given the 
numerous, major crimes of which Juror Gordon claimed that he and his family were victims, the trial court 
abused its discretion in failing to find intentional concealment.”) 
72 Kimberly Ayn Eckhart, State v. Furutani: Hawai’i’s Protection of a Defendant’s Right to a Fair Trial – 
Verdict Impeachment Made Easy, 17 HAW. L. REV. 307, 326-27 (1995).   
73 Loewy, supra note 59 at 758.   
74 See id. at 742-43.   
